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State and Women in Modern Japan:
Feminist Discourses in the Meiji and Taish¯ Eras
Barbara Molony

The relationship of women to the Japanese state has been the object of much
discussion in Japanese studies in recent years. To be sure, there are as many ways to
approach this topic as there are conceptions of ‘the state’ and of ’women.’ Both of
these terms are embedded in complicated and historically contingent discourse fields,
making it impossible to posit just one or two types of relationships linking the two
categories, as they are not fixed. Some scholars look at women as the target of
government policies;1 some examine women as agents of some part of the state;2 some
are interested in women in organized or institutionalized politics or movements;3 some
study women in groups that articulate with state power;4 and others look at the
discourses about women and the state.5

This study considers one aspect of this last approach, examining the relationship of
women and the state through discourses on ‘women’s rights’ from the mid-Meiji era
through the Taish¯ era. Many scholars have grounded their work on the assumption
that the ‘state’ was an entity distinct from women or women’s groups, with which women
sought alliance to achieve shared goals, against which they struggled for justice, or in
which they sought membership.6 While a stress on resistance or on accommodation
appears to be making vastly different points of view about women’s relationship to the
state, they do, in fact, share an assumption that the state had an a priori existence with
which women could articulate, but not really change.

Bringing the question of rights into the picture, however, muddies the waters
considerably, because possession of rights assumes a degree of ownership of the state
and thus the ability to influence it. Women’s rights discussions are particularly germane
to an understanding of the ideology of the state in any society, and Japan is no
exception. The struggle for women’s rights, while overlooked by many historians in the
past, has in more recent years captured the imagination of other historians as an
21

inspirational instance of resistance against the state. At the same time, however, the
notion of resistance must be understood in relation to its converse--that is, resistance
is always articulated in relationship to power.7 Rights both embrace and resist power.

‘Rights’ remained a central issue in a wide variety of Japanese intellectual and political
discourses, including feminist discourses, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries.8 But the notion of rights underwent change by the interwar period, as
Japanese people’s understanding of the ‘state’ changed. By then, the state had come
to appear as a reified entity, essentially a bureaucracy with legislative and other
appurtenances shaping it, under an abstraction (the emperor) theorized as defined by
and defining the collective spirit of the kokumin. Ironically, the era of greater democracy
and liberalism was also one in which the contours of the state were already more
established, so women’s struggles for the right of inclusion in the state would potentially
produce more gradual change even if women gained an institutionalized political voice.
In addition to struggling for the right to participate in the state, either in such formal
ways as access to suffrage and political office or in less formal ways such as state
recognition of the ‘voice’ of the ‘kitchen’, feminists also defined women’s rights in the
interwar period to include the notion of ‘protection’ by a state whose prior existence
they acknowledged. That is, in addition to working to be included in the state in order
to alter its constitution in ways beneficial to women and families, feminists sought the
state’s protection from certain aspects of public and private society which they viewed
as oppressive. In the interwar period, these included, but were not restricted to,
demands for protection from institutionalized patriarchy--both state supported patriarchy
and the everyday version of domineering husbands; protection from the excesses of
capitalism; and protection from miserable economic conditions that led to suffering and
deaths of women and their children. Both forms of rights discussions in the interwar era-resistance against participatory exclusion and acceptance of the state’s power to
protect--assumed an existing state structure. Meiji-era discussions of rights assumed
both a more fluid political situation and a less precise definition of rights.

Meiji-era rights discourse
9
In Japan as in many other societies, ‘rights’ had multiple meanings. Rights discourse
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was lively and diverse, particularly because it originally surfaced in a variety of contexts,
and blended notions of Tokugawa anti-authoritarianism

10

with frequently conflated

‘Western’ rights discourses. In addition, the terms for ‘rights’ (kenri), ‘women's rights’
(joken), ‘male-female equality’ (danjo by¯d¯), ‘male-female equal rights’ (danjo d¯ken),
and other concepts in the lexicon of rights were themselves neologisms. (These terms
were, at times, used interchangeably, though their meanings were actually distinct.)11
Moreover, state, nation, nationality, ethnicity, gender, and so on were all in the process
of mutual construction around the same time, and in some cases, rights discourse was
used selectively to resist the emerging structure of one or another of these categories.
Conversely, rights discourse could also be employed to help reify any of these
categories or institutions.

People's Rights advocate Ueki Emori notwithstanding, however--Ueki claimed that men
and women were entitled to equal rights and that resistance to unresponsive
government was a people's right and duty--most Meiji-era advocates for women did not
call for resistance to the state or society leading to its overthrow and replacement by a
rights-paradise for women.12 ‘Resistance’ occurred within the regimes of power it called
into question.13 To put it a bit more simply, until the rise of socialist feminism in the last
decade of the Meiji period, women's rights called for inclusion, not revolution--and even
most socialists sought inclusion in the absence of a revolution.14 I suggest two reasons
for feminists’ desire for inclusion: first, the fundamental nature of rights themselves; and
second, the identification, for some Meiji-era women's advocates, of rights with
recognition and rewarding of female self-cultivation as a marker of a woman's
personhood.

Rights discussions in the late Meiji era, whether by advocates for men or women,
developed in a context of iconoclastic rejection of past (Tokugawa) relations of power
and of engagement with foreign ideas. That power (a state, social norms, laws,
customs, and so on) would exist was not questioned; it was a given. One's relationship
to power was under discussion. Feminisms have often been about--as feminist theorist
Wendy Brown notes—‘a longing to share in power rather than be protected from its
15

excesses.’
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Any quest for rights, then, might seem rather ironic. One of the purposes of rights is
protection from something--from encroachment by another public person, from
encroachment by the state, from being limited in one’s expression, and so on. (The
various notions of rights are frequently in conflict--one’s freedom of expression, for
example, might conflict with another’s right to protection.) These notions of rights as
protection from encroachment were clearly shared by some Meiji rights advocates; but
to what extent were they applied to women? I would argue that the idea of rights as
protection from the state was a minor thread in women’s rights talk--that the main focus
was on inclusion in the state and equality in both the private domain of the family and
16

the public domain of civil society.

Admittedly, a ‘public/private’ dichotomy does not

quite work here, where women sought to empower themselves in the family (‘private’)
through means of the law (‘public’) and through public recognition of their intellectual
accomplishments. The notion of protection was not absent from Meiji discourse but it
arose more in connection with the idea of ‘liberation’(kaih¯) than with rights. Liberation
was not used in discussing women's political rights until Socialists began using the term
in 1907. Kaih¯ was first used to discuss the liberation of prostituted women and girls
from contractual bondage and came to include, by the end of the century, liberation of
17

wives, through divorce, from oppressive marriages.

Protection, which came to occupy

a central place in women’s rights discussions in the twentieth century, was simply the
fortunate outcome of women’s struggle for respect, the dominant Meiji-era feminist
focus.

As theorist Carole Pateman and others have shown, the notion of ‘civil’ has had shifting
meanings in Western discourse. Before the creation of the social contract, ‘civil’ was
seen as the opposite of ‘natural’; thereafter, it was seen as the opposite of ‘private.’ 18
Thus, by the nineteenth century in the West, civil society came to be viewed as standing
in opposition to the family (the private).19 But such an opposition was not assumed by
women's rights advocates in turn-of-the-century Japan.20 While many did assume the
family was a warm (private) haven from a cold public world, many others in the early
Meiji period believed women were dealt a raw deal in the stereotypical early modern
Japanese family. Later Meiji images of the family may not have been so gloomy for
24

women, but again, the family was not seen as something separate from the public
sphere. Indeed, many believed women deserved a public role not despite their family
status but because of it. Thus, for instance, the mother who kept her family healthy was
seen, during the first Sino-Japanese War (1894-95), as serving her nation publicly.21
The ideological opponents of the women’s rights advocates--gender conservatives who
opposed any concept of inherent (natural) rights or even earned rights based on service
22

in the public sphere--also argued that the family was the basis of the state.

But their

idea of ‘family’ was a patriarchy with no thought of rights or even equality among its
members. So where did rights advocates start their quest for women's rights?

Although the earliest discussions of rights in the 1870s and 1880s often did not explicitly
correlate rights with male gender, the Japanese discussants frequently employed the
ideas of Rousseau, whose vision of a social contract was founded on the rights of men
in fraternity.23 Those men and (the smaller group of) women who clamored for rights
in the 1870s demanded the rights of political participation or inclusion. By 1890, a tiny
minority of men had been awarded the right of inclusion in the state and civil society,
but women were pointedly excluded from political participation.24

The dominant

conservatives had gendered the state ‘male’ by 1890--maleness was required of all
government officials, including the emperor. By the turn of the century, the requirement
of male gender for political participation was taken for granted by many; the state itself
was being constructed as a fraternity under a patriarchal emperor.

25

Indeed, when

political rights were extended in 1890 to some of the men who had earlier demanded
rights of fraternal inclusion, many of those activists followed up on their demands by
joining parties and entering the government in some capacity.26

Nineteenth-century Japanese advocates for women were, of course, of varying minds
about the definition of ‘women's rights’, but all agreed that women did not have rights
at that time. Some argued for a communitarian inclusiveness reminiscent of the
Rousseauian ideas espoused in the 1870s, when neither men nor women had political
rights. Others, inspired by Mill, stressed improved education as a way for women to
gain the subjectivity that would make them eligible for rights. Others believed inclusion
must follow the elimination of patriarchal sexual privileges, such as those implied by
25

polygamy, prostitution, and patrilineality.27

In its formulation and its legal applications, the concept of rights is one which separates
the individual from his or her community rather than embracing the notion of community.
People struggle for rights on behalf of an oppressed identity group (a class, a gender,
an ethnicity), but when rights are granted they are applied to individuals.28 Japanese
commentators on Meiji civil law, both before and after the implementation of the Civil
Code of 1898, rightly argued that this concept of rights was at odds with the notion,
codified in the Constitution of 1889, that women, and especially wives, were under the
jurisdiction of the patriarchal family head, and thus had no individual rights within the
community of the family nor the independent right of contract that would permit rights
29

in the larger society.

The Civil Code, therefore, explicitly excluded the idea of rights

held equally by separate individuals (irrespective of household membership).30

Nevertheless, Japanese supporters of improving the lot of women brought rights in as
a means to elevate women’s status. Many saw rights in terms of inclusion in state and
civil society rather than as a basis for continuing resistance and separation from power.
In this regard, they had many parallels with Western notions of the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries. Mill and Rousseau were particularly important sources in the
development of Japanese thinking about rights. Under the social contract, which had
come to be understood in the West as occurring after the defeat of the metaphorical
father (the patriarchal king), individuals voluntarily gave up some rights in return for the
protection of civil law and inclusion in the fraternity of citizens. Liberty, equality, and
fraternity were the ideal of the civil, or public, sphere following the French Revolution.

31

The problem with this construct was that its theorists supposed that only ‘individuals’
could enter into this contract; because of their putative weakness in strength and
intellect, women were not entitled to ownership of property in the person, and were
therefore not individuals. For Mill, women were thus not in the public, or civil, sphere,
and where they were--the home--was to be ‘private’ or off limits to the state and
dominated by the home's own patriarch, who was part of the civil, egalitarian ‘fraternity.’
Not surprisingly, advocates of women's rights (including Mill) reckoned that education
26

was one key to making women deserving of being ‘individuals’ and therefore improving
their status, but even Mill did not know what to do with a husband's right to dominance
in marriage. Rousseau, male-centered though his writings often appear, did, in fact,
have a publicly important role for women. Men could not be ‘brothers’ if they were not
ethical fathers and sons, and the mother was the key to preserving the moral and
ethical family. This idea resonated with women's rights thinking in turn-of-the-century
Japan, one of whose key components was moral and intellectual cultivation and its
connection with social respect.

Historians of Japan have traditionally raised concerns about ‘state intrusion in the
family’, but that formulation ignores the fact that patriarchal dominance may have felt
just as confining to many women as state authoritarianism. Indeed, one component of
state authoritarianism was the reification of male dominance in family law. Inclusion in
the state, which must be preceded or accompanied by inclusion in the public sphere,
has thus been a goal (though one fraught with problems as well) of many feminist
political activists, whether Japanese or Western. Patriarchal problems in the ‘private’
sphere seemed so debilitating in Meiji Japan that issues surrounding marriage and
sexuality became a major early concern of advocates of women's rights. Here we can
see the precursors to later feminists’ emphases on ‘protection’; it should be kept in
mind, however, that Meiji-era feminists principally argued for respect for women and
their personhood rather than for protection of them as weak.

Though concepts of rights and participation in civil society as they developed in
eighteenth and nineteenth century Western thought were central to the mid- to late-Meiji
discourse on rights, the context was quite different. Most significantly, the metaphorical
patriarch (the emperor) was not defeated in Japan but rather was theorized as the
abstract centerpiece of a male-gendered (and upper-class centered) polity. Indeed,
male sex was made a requirement for emperorship in 1890, which surprised and
disheartened many women's rights advocates.32

Nevertheless, male though the

emperor had to be, he co-existed with a slowly expanding participatory society, a
scenario that led many advocates of rights, both civil and women's rights, to continue
to look, in varying degrees, to Western discussions of rights as desirable and perhaps
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even normative. Rights discourse was a big tent that accommodated a variety of
opinions, and Japanese thinkers, male and female, radical or liberal, drew on different
bits of this diverse discourse.

The issues raised by Meiji-era women’s rights advocates developed in the context of
men’s political rights. The concept of male fraternity, so central to Rousseauian rights
discourse, was deeply embedded in Japanese social culture, even in contexts in which
rights were not at issue.33 Some women who used notions of rights to advocate
elevating the status of women would have agreed with the gender essentialism implied
in the fraternity concept while rejecting the notion that it might imply male superiority;
others leaned toward the notion of rights inherent in individuals irrespective of gender.
But because women’s rights implied women’s inclusion in the state and civil society-which would erode a sense of fraternity of male citizens--and because most advocates
for women recognized that equality first required the destruction of patriarchal family
practices such as polygamy, prostitution, and patrilineality, women’s rights talk
eventually moved in divergent directions from (male) rights discourse after the 1890s,
when some men became enfranchised citizens.

It is tempting to analyse women’s rights primarily in terms of politics, but we would
overlook a significant part of the discussion about women in Meiji-era Japan if we did
so. At that time, discussions of women’s rights were closely related to discussions of
women’s education, particularly education beyond the elementary level. Cultivating a
good, moral, ethical, responsible character capable of manifesting agency--through
being an exemplar or even a leader--was a goal of Confucian education as well as the
recently introduced Western-style learning. Intellectual and moral cultivation produced
a person worthy of respect, worthy of having a recognizable subjectivity. The centrality
of education, with its deep connections to notions of respect and ethical leadership
(which itself implies both agency and a relationship to regimes of power), in turn-of-thecentury rights discourse suggests that rights at that time were closely connected to the
yearning for respect for women’s subjectivity. And that subjectivity was conceived
within the frame of power of contemporary Japanese society. Talk of rights takes
persons’ subjectivity for granted; talk of education as self-cultivation advances the
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cause of women’s subjectivity. In Meiji Japan, even the type of education which
claimed to train women who did not need political rights (narrowly defined as the vote)
was to mould ethical wives and mothers who led by example in the family and in civil
society. These women would be active not in electoral politics but, as individuals or as
members of organizations, in public activities such as poor relief or more controversial
reforms like those calling for regulation of sexuality.34

Some scholars suggest that 1890s discourses on women, which focused more on
educated women managing a warm, loving family and home (katei) or playing a
leadership role in legal reification of moral reform (especially reform of the patriarchal
35

family), was a shift away from 1880s discourses focusing on political rights.

But I

would argue that there was no real gulf between the 1880s and the 1890s when viewed
from the perspective of subjectivity. If, before 1890, ‘male-female equality’ (danjo

by¯d¯) was much discussed, it was used both as the ground for joken and d¯ken
(women's rights and equal rights) and as the justification for the attack on polygamy.
Unlike joken advocates, advocates of monogamy did not necessarily wish women to be
active in politics, but they did view women as fully realized individuals deserving equality
and respect. Both types sought women's inclusion in society, one through political, civil,
or civic participation on a par with men, the other through the use of law to improve
familial relations, which would further the dissolving of barriers between public and
private spheres. This approach to improving the status and conditions of women
continued in the 1890s, supplemented by discussions of equal rights and, most
noticeably, discourse on education. Ethical and well-trained women were worthy of
respect and were, therefore, integrated with society, a necessary step toward inclusion
in the state and possession of rights.

From the beginning of the Meiji period, what later came to be called fujinron (discourse
on womanhood) occupied the attention of quite a few commentators, many of whom
discussed education, especially in the context of morality in the family and, by
extension, in the whole nation. Meiroku zasshi (founded 1873, circulation 3,000) was
an early venue for these discussions.36 Fukuzawa Yukichi, perhaps the most famous
early participant in the "fujin rons¯," and author of the influential Nihon fujinron in 1885,
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stressed monogamy as the basis of equality (by¯d¯).37 Elsewhere, Fukuzawa linked
‘equality’ closely to education.

Like Fukuzawa, female advocates for women also linked education, monogamy, and
respect. Going beyond the printed word alone, women advocates took the feminist
message to the public through political speeches, like those of (Nakajima) Kishida
Toshiko and Fukuda Kageyama Hideko. They also organized civic groups, thereby
moving into and helping to develop civil society in Meiji Japan. Kishida Toshiko gave
scores of speeches between 1882 and 1884. Her talks were pointedly political, calling
for equal rights for men and women, decrying the stultifying effects of repression of
freedom of thought, denouncing the equating of personhood with male gender alone38
and, above all, calling on women to develop the mental strength (seishin ryoku) to be
confident public persons.39 Kishida rhetorically connected the development of women's
subjectivity--their existence as persons in society--both to national strength and to
People’s Rights politics. Because ‘[e]quality, independence, respect, and a
monogamous relationship are the hallmarks of relationships between men and women
in a civilized society,’ she stated, women’s rights would elevate Japan in international
esteem and thereby aid in its defense against a possible Western threat.40 Kishida also
gave sexual inequality a political twist her colleagues in the People's Rights movement
would not fail to grasp when she equated male supremacy with the government's
dominion over the people--as in her speech entitled ‘The government is the people's
god; man is woman's god’ (SeifË wa jinmin no ten; otoko wa onna no ten).

41

Kishida inspired women all over Japan.42 Women's groups sprang up in cities and
towns, large and small--many of them to welcome speakers like Kishida. There were
Women's Friendly Societies (joshi konshinkai), Women's Freedom Parties (fujin jiyËt¯)
Women's Rights Associations (jokenkai), Women's Societies (fujin ky¯kai), and at least
one Women's Freedom Hall (joshi jiyËkan).43 Whether these groups continued to exist
long after they sponsored Kishida and others is unclear. Yet they did have specific
goals, and they did participate in feminist discourses that continued in later decades.
Their role in disseminating ideas of rights and reforms is as significant as their role in
involving women in non-governmental advocacy groups outside the home. Moreover,
30

they helped set the stage for the growth of larger and more influential feminist groups,
such as the Japan Christian Women’s Reform Society (Nihon Kirisutoky¯ Fujin

Ky¯fukai) or the Women’s Morality Associations (Fujin Tokugikai) in the next half
decade, and they created a context for the expansion of women’s rights discourses in
magazines and journals in the 1890s.

44

These groups advocated monogamy and

women’s sexual dignity and fostered political discussion and collaborative feminist
efforts to set up schools for girls and women.45 ‘Joseiron’ in these groups meant
discourses on ways to improve women’s lot through politicizing the private by means
of education, marital respect, and the relationship of these to public voice and selfcultivation.
Educator Fukuda Hideko followed in Kishida’s footsteps.46 Inspired by Kishida, the
young Hideko founded a community women’s group that brought in speakers on natural
rights, equality, and freedom.

47

In 1890, Fukuda petitioned the Diet to permit women’s

political participation--a clear use of what she viewed as her right to address the
government.48 In 1891, Fukuda caught the attention of the mainstream media with her
proposal to establish a newspaper for women run entirely by women.49 Like Kishida,
Fukuda tied women’s rights and political involvement to strengthening the nation.50
Though more famous than most of their contemporaries, Fukuda and Kishida were not
alone among women and men who translated into notable political action their desire
for women’s right of inclusion, for education, and for the respect that came with
personhood.

The rhetoric of rights was further developed in new journals and magazines that
appeared in the late 19th century. The most important of these new journals for women
was Jogaku zasshi (Women’s education journal), co-founded by Iwamoto Yoshiharu
(Zenji) in 1885, and edited by him for most of its eighteen years. Jogaku zasshi
employed the talents of numerous writers, including at least eight women known in their
day as advocates of rights, both women's rights and people's rights; the most famous
of these were probably Shimizu Toyoko, Nakajima Kishida Toshiko, and Wakamatsu
Shizu (who married Iwamoto in 1889).51 All were influenced by the readily accessible
thought of the freedom and people's rights polemicists as well as lively intellectual
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discourse in other publications like the Meiroku zasshi of the previous decade and

Kokumin no tomo, a journal which shared a readership with Jogaku zasshi.52 From
these sources, the writers were influenced by a diverse body of thought on rights.

Raising women’s status had particular and shifting meanings to Iwamoto Yoshiharu. In
1885, Iwamoto stressed that women’s human character must be recognized; like men,
women were human.53 He argued for the fundamental equality of men and women--

danjo by¯d¯--although he rejected male/female equal rights--danjo d¯ken.54 Danson
johi (respect the male, despise the female) was particularly odious to Iwamoto.55
Christianity, which permeated Iwamoto’s thinking, emphasized the equal humanity of
men and women in the eyes of God.56 Women must not be seen as less than human,
he wrote in 1885, but that did not imply that men and women must be granted equal
rights; servants are human, too, but they do not have the same rights as their
employers.57 Though Iwamoto believed in gender equality before God, he took social
stratification by gender as perfectly natural, as did many contemporary social contract
theorists in the West, whose grounding was also in Christianity. From the mid-1880s
to the early 1890s, when Iwamoto fervently espoused education for women, he also
believed that the purpose of women’s education should differ from men’s. Women must
be trained to be good wives and mothers--but he called for a ‘modern’ type of wife and
58

mother.

Christian, modern (kirisutoky¯teki, kindaiteki) thinking would respect men and

women for the particular roles each fulfilled. It would elevate women's status. It would
create mothers who were intelligent and wives who were good persons, and not merely
mothers who were wise educators of their children and wives who served their
husbands well. But it would not necessarily require political rights identical to those of
men.59 Such a concept of rights, which would set a woman apart from the community
constituted by her family, was alien to Iwamoto's communitarian construction of rights
at that time. To counter opponents' criticism that educated women made bad wives,

Jogaku zasshi extolled the virtues of an educated wife.60

Iwamoto was bitterly disappointed in the 1889 Constitution. His sense of betrayal when
he read that gender determined imperial succession61 comes across as surprising
naiveté to a late twentieth-century observer. But interestingly, it was after this shock
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that Iwamoto adopted a new approach to women’s education and to women’s rights.
In a June 1889 article entitled ‘100-Year Chronic Disease’ (Hyaku-nen no koshitsu),
Iwamoto presented a stinging criticism of sexism in education.62 If Japanese opposed
women's high schools, objected to women voting, objected to monogamy, insulted the
morality of female students, and failed to regard men and women as equally human,
then Japan would never cure its century-long chronic disease. The ruler would be
separated from the people, the people from the officials, the slave from the master, the
rich from the poor. It is remarkable how advocacy of the education of women, of
Christian moralism, of religious egalitarianism, and of women's civil rights are all brought
under one discursive umbrella. Moreover, the article's rhetorical device of equating the
disease with standard symbols of Tokugawa authoritarianism like the separation of the
ruler and the ruled or the people and the officials is a powerful one.

Jogaku zasshi published a number of criticisms of the denial of women's right of political
inclusion in 1890. In an unsigned article, Jogaku zasshi called for women to take part
in political discussions in order to promote ‘political harmony among men and women’
(seijij¯ danjo ky¯wa).63 Shimizu Toyoko wrote in August 1890, condemning the recent
passage of legislation barring women from political meetings, that ‘if individual rights are
to be protected, and the peace and order of society secured, laws should not be
discriminatory, granting advantage to men only, and misfortune only to women.’64 In
another article two months later, Shimizu considered it irrational that ‘one part of
humanity arbitrarily control...the other part.’65 These articles indicate Shimizu's individual
rights-based concept of women's rights as well as her displeasure with the denial of
women's agency.

Many advocates of women's rights focused on sexuality issues in their struggle for
developing women's personhood and dignity. The heterosexual relationship was
problematized early on in the discussions on womanhood (fujinron), as seen in the early
discussions by Meiroku zasshi writers. These articles stressed the damage done by
polygamy to Japanese ethical values and Japan's resulting weakness in the face of the
West. Feminists expanded these ideas and discussed control of sexuality--that of men
and of some women--as a way of improving women's conditions and helping their
development as full, equal human beings, a necessary condition not only for
33

respectibility but also for inclusion in the state and civil society.

Sexuality issues were increasingly politicized after the founding of the Tokyo (later
Japan) Christian Women’s Reform Society by Yajima Kajiko in 1886.66

Articles

discussing the Reform Society’s views on monogamy as moral, as good for Japan, as
respecting nature’s gender balance, and as a move away from evil customs of the
Confucian past emerged in articles by and about the Reform Society’s political activities
in T¯un shinbun and T¯ky¯ Fujin Ky¯fukai zasshi in the late 1880s.
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Jogaku zasshi,

another source of information about the Reform Society, also stressed control of male
sexuality through the banning of polygamy in an 1887 article by Iwamoto entitled ‘The
atmosphere of adultery’ (Kan’in no kËki), for which the entire issue in which it was to
appear was banned by the government.68

Women's advocates’ main view of polygamy was that it was a denigration of women's
rights. For that reason, Yajima and others were passionate in their struggle against it-this was no abstraction to them. In 1889, Yajima delivered to government officials a
petition with 800 signatures, demanding an end to concubinage. She took a dagger on
this mission, prepared to commit suicide if she were unable to hand over her petition.69

Tokyo nichi nichi shinbun reported that in November 1891, the Reform Society planned
to submit a petition to the Diet for legislation banning polygamy. Thus, the Reform
Society recognized the use of the power of the state in influencing equality in the
marriage relationship.70 Male morality was often at stake in these discussions; Shimizu
Toyoko, for instance, wrote an article entitled ‘Discussing Japanese Males’ Moral
Character’ (Nihon danshi no hink¯ o ronzu).71

Discussions about controlling male sexuality were accompanied by those concerning
the control of some women's sexuality. Reform Society goals included the elimination
of prostitution as well as concubinage as two sides of the same coin.

72

The sex trade

denigrated wives by supporting husbands' adultery, and thus was seen as a women's
rights issue that focused on legitimate wives. As for women in the sex trades
themselves, Reform Society attitudes were often unsympathetic. T¯ky¯ Fujin Ky¯fu

zasshi called for shaming women into leaving sex work: ‘Succumbing to the easier life
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of prostitution...they brazenly walk the streets in broad daylight....There is no way to
stop them other than to shame them into reforming!’ Overseas prostitution, moreover,
shamed Japan as a whole, the journal noted, and may have contributed to antiJapanese discrimination in the United States.73 The Reform Society's concern about
prostitution was, in these types of comments, less connected to saving fallen women-which was, in fact, another goal of the organization--than to supporting the human
dignity and equal personhood of wives and improving Japan’s foreign relations.

Gaining subjectivity was an important requirement for eligibility for rights; and rights
discourse was a well-used way of discussing subjectivity. The two were often elided.
The issue of ‘morality’ was essential to women's subjectivity. This can be seen, for
instance, in the journal Joken (Women's rights). Established in September 1891, Joken
included articles by leading feminists such as Fukuda Hideko and reported extensively
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on the activities of Women's Morality Associations (fujin tokugikai) throughout Japan.

The goals of various branches of this association called for freedom (jiyË), equality
(by¯d¯), women's rights (joken), and morality (tokugi).75 The Women's Morality
Association's stated goal was ‘the expansion of women's rights and the elimination of
the evil of “respect the male and despise the female.”’ 76 Like Jogaku zasshi, Joken, in
an 1891 article entitled ‘People's Rights or Men's Rights?’ (Minken ka danken ka?),
strongly criticized the exclusion of women from the political world, arguing that ’rights’
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should not be gendered.

The Women's Reform Society and the Women's Morality Association attempted to push
their agendas in the political arena. That venue was quite restricted, however. Even
before the revisions of the Police Security Regulations of 1890, with its infamous ‘Article
5’ which banned women from all political participation, including political speaking and
assembly, women had been pointedly excluded from participation in the City-TownVillage Regulations of 1889.78 Feminists submitted petitions to the Diet to eliminate
these restrictions, but failed.79 In response, feminist Shimizu Toyoko contributed her
important article in Jogaku zasshi, ‘Why are women not permitted to take part in political
meetings?’ (Naniyue ni joshi wa seiden shËkai ni sanch¯ suru no o yurusarezaru ka?).80
One response by the government, in turn, was a Diet member's assertion that women
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should not have political rights because they should focus on their work in the home-81

the first such assertion in the Diet.

Failing to gain a political voice, women’s rights

advocates did not abandon their cause, but turned even more attention to the issues
of sexuality, which were now redefined as ‘social’ rather than the banned ‘political’.
Economic independence became yet another part of feminists’ quest for sexualitybased marital respect as an element in social reforms.

Shimizu (and others) connected the rights of citizens (kokumin) with social and moral
issues.82 Women needed to be citizens--to have the right of participation--because they
should educate their children as citizens and support their husbands in the exercise of
their citizenship. Thus, Shimizu posited that women's political rights arose from their
relationship with those who had (some) rights. This resonated with Kishida Toshiko's
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1884 article, ‘Appeal to my sisters,’ (D¯h¯ shimai ni tsugu). Women's advocacy

groups, then, restructured the political to be more like the social or moral. Advocacy of
improving women's conditions did not end with Article 5; concerns about morality, the
home, economic conditions, and other issues took center stage as women moved
increasingly into public realms of advocacy (civil society). And women's education was
essential to this ability to penetrate civil society by creating women's personhood or
subjectivity. For late Meiji-era feminists, the state was still an entity in formation. Many
believed that women’s involvement with the state through their quest for rights was
bound to alter it.

The political use of liberal notions of rights was not limited to ’bourgeois’ women in the
late Meiji era. As Vera Mackie notes in her recent study, socialist women led the
earliest campaigns, from 1904 to 1909, to revise Article 5 of the Public Peace Police
Law, which prohibited women from attendance at political meetings as well as
membership in political parties.
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Putting women in the same category as minors, an
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editorial in Fukuda Hideko’s newspaper Sekai fujin stated, was insulting. These

campaigns by socialist women to revise Article 5 were unsuccessful, the socialist
newspaper Heimin shinbun reported-- blending class analysis and feminism--, because
the House of Peers, ‘an organization made up of members of the male class (danshi

kaikyË no ichi dantai). . .do not see women as human individuals (ikko no jinrui) or as
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citizens of the nation (ikko no kokumin).86

Taish¯ Feminisms
Discussions of women’s rights were common in the Taish¯ era. Many women and men
across the political spectrum engaged these issues through words and through political
actions. This section addresses a narrow but important segment of that rights
discourse--that engaged in by leading suffragists. In the Taish¯ era, the conception of
the state held by most feminists (including some socialist feminists) was as a relatively
fixed entity with which they sought alignment in some form or from which they sought
protection from social or economic oppression. This notion of the state framed the
‘motherhood protection debate’ (bosei hogo rons¯) early in the Taish¯ era. This debate,
carried out by a handful of activists and writers in the pages of national circulation
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magazines, has been treated in detail by numerous scholars, so my discussion of it

will be very brief here. What is salient in terms of women’s relationship to the state is
the recognition by all but one of the participants that the state owed mothers
‘protection.’ Hiratsuka Raich¯ argued that women performed a service to the state by
giving birth and, thus, deserved financial payment. Socialist Yamakawa Kikue seemed
to reject the arguments of the other three as bourgeois, stating that all members of
society would be protected if the capitalist order were replaced by socialism; yet she,
too, called for state support of maternity, albeit in a completely reformed state. Yamada
Waka took an essentialist point of view of women’s biological duties, but in the end she
called for both husbands and the state to support maternity. Only Yosano claimed that
focussing on protection from the state was ‘slave morality’ (dorei d¯toku); even she
conceded the desirability, however, of a system of insurance that would compensate
women for wages lost while recovering from childbirth. For all of these 1910s feminists,
then, the state had taken on a role as protector of (gendered) rights of maternity. I view
this as a changing attitude based on feminists’ thinking that the state had become a
reified institution capable both of protecting rights against societal or civil oppression
and of denying rights to groups or individuals who then must either resist the state or
struggle for inclusion in it.88

The notion that the state was an entity that should protect classes of individuals against
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societal exploitation, and which consisted of individuals with the right of membership,
is clearly evident in the founding of the New Woman Association (Shin Fujin Ky¯kai) in
1919. To achieve the rights of protection and inclusion, women had to identify as a
class, noted Hiratsuka Raich¯, one of the group’s three founding mothers (the other two
were Ichikawa Fusae and Oku Mumeo). Invited to speak to the All-Kansai Federation
of Women's Organizations in late November 1919, Hiratsuka delivered a talk entitled
‘Toward the Unification of Women.’89 Identifying women as a class, Hiratsuka called for
women to unite to articulate common concerns and demand power. As possessors of
rights, women would be part of the state that would determine ‘the future.’ Women
were no longer in need of proving their wisdom and talent, as they had been in the late
nineteenth century. Rights should be theirs--if only women would communicate to
achieve those rights. Her vision of rights included different but complementary roles
and identities for men and women. In addition, Hiratsuka articulated two types of
feminist rights in her comments--women's rights (joken) and mothers' rights (boken).
Women can be individuals, but motherhood requires at least one relationship, that of
mother and child; mothers' rights are by definition relational.

Shortly after this speech, sometime in November or December, Ichikawa joined
Hiratsuka to draft the New Woman Association’s two central demands. The first of the
two proposals demanded revision of the Public Peace Police Law (Chian keisatsuh¯)
of 1900. As we have seen, protest against Article 5 of that law was not new. The
feminist fight against the Police Law of 1900 was also inspired by the increasing
successes of women’s rights movements outside Japan. In contrast to many women
in the West, Ichikawa noted, ‘[Japanese women] could not even listen to political
speeches. We greatly resented this.’90

The second major program of the NWA also had foreign parallels. Inspired by recent
developments in domestic legislation in Europe and the United States, Hiratsuka
proposed that the NWA seek passage of legislation to protect women from marrying
men with sexually transmitted disease and to assist wives who had been infected by
their carrier husbands.91 Legal inequalities, she noted, created hardships for women
victimized by the dreaded disease. The Revised Civil Code of 1898 stipulated that a
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Japanese wife was subject to divorce and two years imprisonment for committing
adultery but was unable to file for divorce should she discover--and venereal disease
was a strong indication--that her husband engaged in extra-marital sexual relations.92
The NWA’s proposed reform of the divorce laws to permit women to reject syphilitic
husbands or fiancés directly challenged the patriarchal family system, which gave few
rights to members other than the patriarch. Although Ichikawa was not as committed
at that time to the struggle for domestic rights as was her colleague, she agreed to work
for the second program as she realized its importance in the fight for equality.
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Hiratsuka, Ichikawa, and Oku met with other activists at Hiratsuka's home on 6 January
1920 and decided to present two petitions before the forty-second session of the Diet.
These petitions were printed in the opening pages of almost every issue of Josei d¯mei
(Women's League)--the NWA organ that began publication later that year--as a
constant reminder to supporters of the centrality of these issues. The petitions read:
1. We, the undersigned, seek repeal of the word ‘women’ from Clause
One and the words ‘women and’ from Clause Two [of Article 5 of the
Public Peace Police Law].
2. We, the undersigned, support enactment of a law protecting women
who marry men with venereal disease, according to the following
provisions: a. Men who have contracted the disease are to be
prevented from marrying; b. A man wishing to marry must present the
results of a doctor's physical exam to his intended spouse,
ascertaining his freedom from disease; c. This proof of health should
accompany the marriage certificate and be incorporated into the
family register; d. A marriage may be annulled if it is discovered that
the husband concealed the presence of venereal disease; e. Wives
whose husbands have become infected after marriage or who are
infected by their husband may file for divorce; f. Wives infected by
their husbands may collect monetary compensation for medical
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expenses and other damages even after divorce.
Petition 1 unambiguously demanded the identical rights of citizenship and inclusion in
the state enjoyed by men. Petition 2 called for women’s protection by the state against
potentially deadly excesses inherent in the family system.

The supporters of these petitions adopted several strategies in response to opposition.
To those who maintained that political rights for women would destroy the Japanese
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family by changing the wife’s role, Ichikawa argued that revision of the Police Law would
not harm womanly virtues but would, in fact, help women become better wives and
wiser mothers; a politically aware mother was better informed and, therefore, able to
rear better children. Ichikawa’s conflation of wifehood and motherhood sounded natural
to her listeners because the discourses on wifehood and motherhood were becoming
increasingly blended in the popular mind by the clichéd phrase, ‘good wife, wise
mother.’ Supporters of ‘motherhood’ ranged from conservatives to feminists, the latter
stressing that by valuing motherhood society would value women. But ‘wifehood’ in its
official (state) interpretation was not liberatory. Wives were, at worst, under patriarchal
control and, at best, responsible for family-supporting productivity.95 For wise mothers,
who carried out an important role in moulding the future, political rights could be
arguably necessary; for wives, who had no property to protect and who had productive
responsibilities to the state and family, political rights may have been harder to justify.
In eviscerating the wife role by focussing on the mother role, Ichikawa, who was neither
a wife nor a mother, appears to have abandoned the Meiji-era feminists’ tack of linking
women’s rights--in an era when the state was still viewed as being under construction-with respect for wives and encouragement of their education as a basis for developing
the subjectivity necessary for equality.

To those who contended that enactment of a law protecting married women's health
would undermine the husband's dominant position within the family, the NWA answered
that a husband's venereal disease, which would affect the well-being of the children,
was even more debilitating to the family.
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This approach also shifted the discourse

from wifehood to motherhood, using the malleability of ‘good wife, wise mother,’ a
phrase Ichikawa scorned but manipulated when necessary. By focussing on the
groom’s health and not the bride’s, the petition ran into strong opposition. Meiji-era
feminists had identified women’s rights with respect for women’s full personhood.
Women gained subjectivity as respected and educated wives in a society free of
patriarchy, polygamy and prostitution. Meiji women’s rights discourses boldly attacked
extramarital male sexuality. By the Taish¯ era, male sexuality was identified with
patriarchy, which was supported by law and by the state. To change male sexual
privilege, then, Taish¯ feminists had to cast their arguments in terms of other state40

sponsored discourses, particularly ‘good wife, wise motherism.’97 The petition justified
exempting brides from VD screening by noting that men's sexual habits were dissolute
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and self indulgent. Among women, only prostitutes were so morally lax.

Because even sexuality had been politicized by the legal reification of patriarchy, the
NWA found that they had to give priority to efforts to revise the Police Law. No political
activity could be carried out without first revising the Police Law. Yet advocacy of
change in the law could in itself be a violation of that law. For their first foray into
politics, therefore, the NWA felt a petition, stamped with the family seals (hanko) of
Japanese subjects and presented to the Diet, would be the most effective first step
toward changing the law. In the event, the petition never made it out of Diet committee
and to the full floor of the Diet, as Prime Minister Hara Takashi dissolved the fortysecond Diet session on 26 February.

The dissolution of the Diet relieved Ichikawa, Hiratsuka, and Oku of their lobbying
activities and gave them a chance to work on strengthening the organization of the
NWA and to go to lectures. One lecture Ichikawa and Hiratsuka attended on 4 March
1920 had the interesting title, ‘Current Events as Seen by Intellectuals.’ But their
enjoyment of the lecture was cut short when the two, highly visible in a sea of men,
were arrested for attending a ‘political’ meeting.99 Their arrests animated the activists
all the more. Why, Ichikawa wrote in Josei d¯mei's first issue in October, was it all right
for women to read and write but not to speak and listen?100

Although Ichikawa believed that it was illogical and irrational to distinguish the written
and spoken word, the two are, in fact, quite different as forms of discourse. It is possible
that the authorities figured that written words could inspire criticism but not a mob, as
written words were more likely the possession of middle-class writers, not the workingclass whom they feared. Spoken language has immediacy and irrepressibility. Spoken
words must be heard, while written words can be more easily controlled through
censorship or simply ignored. Moreover, women's voices, distinct from men's, have an
effect on their listeners that is different from men's; written words can be attributed to
a pseudonymous author and gender can be masked. An established state that fears
unpredictable, spontaneous politics seeks means to contain the speech of those not
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part of the state. Feminists recognized this, and in their attempt to join with and benefit
from the existing state, they first sought to claim a political voice. Women would not be
fully members of society until their participation in discourse was as unfettered as
men’s.

Hoping to claim that voice, Ichikawa announced the official principles of the NWA at its
formal ‘opening ceremony’ on 25 March 1920:101

1. To demand equal opportunities for both men and women so that
women might achieve their full potential;
2. To encourage cooperation between men and women who, although
different, have equally important societal functions to perform;
3. To make clear to all the important role of the household in society;
4. To safeguard the rights of women as mothers and daughters by
aiming to promote their best interests and by eliminating impediments
to the exercise of their rights.102
These principles stressed the desirability of women's rights based on gender
differences and on the particular importance of the household and family relationships
(motherhood, daughterhood).

The NWA’s petitions eventually made it to the Diet on 19 July 1920. The agenda for that
day's Diet session contained the long-awaited proposed amendment to the Public
Peace Police Law. Independent Representative Tabuchi Toyokichi made an
impassioned appeal for support of women's political rights:103

There has recently been much talk concerning freedom of speech, but
because this freedom is not respected in this country, there is, even in the
Diet, little respect for freedom of speech. . . In this sense, Japan is a
police state. . . It is deplorable that we legislators have not become fully
aware of this state of affairs. . . I have, therefore, decided. . . to bring this
problem to your attention. . . and to obtain your approval for changes in
Japan's Police Law. . . Specifically, [I support] elimination of the word
"women" from Article Five of the Public Peace Police Law. Gentlemen,
one of the currents of our postwar world is socialism; a second current is
feminism, reaching Japan. . .I wonder if these momentous global changes
will penetrate the Japanese Diet? . . I firmly believe we must look for what
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is valuable in feminism and socialism, adopting what is good and
discarding what is bad. . .Gentlemen, manhood suffrage is widely
discussed in Japan today. . .Political rights for women have spread to
numerous countries, including England and France (sic) [yet] Japan still
does not even recognize suffrage for men! This situation is unacceptable!
. . .I believe some of you are unaware of conditions in the world today.
For Japan to be included among the postwar world’s civilized democracies, Tabuchi
emphasized, its leaders would have to expand the rights and freedoms of all its
subjects, including women.

Although I do not advocate giving women complete suffrage at this time,
I do believe we must give all adult men (those over twenty) the right to
vote. We must extend universal suffrage. . . However, at the same time,
I realize women are also human beings who have a right to free speech.
. . .I believe we must exercise the basic premise of "democracy" which
fosters concepts of equality and support for the weak. . .I urge you not to
derive pleasure from oppressing the weak, but to work for the thirty million
[women] subjects of Japan.104
Tabuchi explicitly differentiated men’s and women’s political rights. He also advocated
revision of Article Five not only because he called for a new relationship between men
and women (as involved subjects) and the state, but also because he wished the state
to protect the ‘weak.’ Shortly thereafter, the Diet was dissolved, so there was no
opportunity for a vote.

At a later Diet session, on 26 February 1921, a nearly unanimous House of
Representatives recommended revising Article 5 to permit women to attend political
meetings and rallies (the prohibition of their joining political parties was not yet lifted,
however). Opposition to the bill, even in this compromised form, was greater in the
House of Peers. The most vocal opponent was Baron Fujimura Yoshir¯, president of

Taish¯ nichi nichi shinbun and a powerful leader in the Upper House. ‘The participation
of women in political movements is extremely boring,’ he remarked condescendingly.
Furthermore, he continued,

it goes against natural laws in a physiological as well as psychological
sense. It is not women's function to be active in political movements
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alongside men. The woman’s place is in the home. Her role is a social
and educational one. . .Furthermore, women’s going out into society and
becoming active in political movements will result in a number of
extremely bad consequences… Take the example of Queen Elizabeth's
reign… What I am saying is supported by our particular traditions,
customs, and history. Finally, giving women the right to participate in
political movements subverts the family system that is the basis of our
social system. I think that the behavior of these new women--these
groups of peculiar women trying to become politically active--is extremely
shameful. [The issue before us] concerns Japan's national polity. . . .I
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believe we should oppose [revision of the Police Law].
Fujimura's colleagues heeded his warnings and defeated the amendment in the closing
minutes of the forty-fourth session.

While the bills were being debated in the Diet, the women of the NWA redefined their
activities to permit them to participate in their own governance while steering clear of
the government’s restrictions on political activities. They turned to projects that were
less likely to be identified with the demand for political rights. The NWA could, then,
rightfully claim not to be purely a political association, something women were
prohibited from joining. Ichikawa worked to dispel the idea that the NWA was only
interested in ‘obtaining political rights for women.’
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Hiratsuka Raich¯ had stated

earlier, in her ®saka speech, that women's status and lives could not be improved
without removing impediments to women's rights--that is, women had to gain equality
in the eyes of the law through political rights. But most advocates of women's rights
presented civil and political rights as a means to an end rather than as an end in
themselves. The end they called for was the improvement of women's lives through
better health, elimination of poverty, better work conditions, protection of motherhood,
and other feminist goals. Even Ichikawa, the feminist most noteworthy for her espousal
of women's political rights, stated that civil rights, while beneficial in themselves, also
were crucial for the improvement of women's lives. Hiratsuka wrote in the first issue of
the NWA’s journal Josei d¯mei that suffrage was not an end in itself but a means to
inject new feminine values into a male political system.107 Non-socialist feminists viewed
the political system and state as already institutionalized by the Taish¯ period. Their
campaign for civil rights, an attempt to become part of that state, was no more an attack
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on the state than was the feminists’ working with the state to gain protections for
women.

Improving women’s lives may appear fundamentally political, but politics were more
narrowly construed in 1920s Japan. Motherhood protection, or health issues, or labour
protection were seen as social reformers’ issues, and though they intersected with
politics by being debated and funded by cabinet and parliament, women’s involvement
with them was often viewed as non-political. Ichikawa and other ‘political’ women
politicized the ‘kitchen’ much later, in the 1930s. In 1920, the struggle for political rights
as an end rather than as a means was viewed by non-feminists as selfish, though
feminist social reform was not. Political rights implied the activist wanted something for
herself--the right to assemble or the right to vote.

In the process of working on health issues or labour reform, women may have been
acting as if they were members of the state, but without specific and articulated rights,
their citizenship was always less than men’s. In 1921, therefore, the leadership of the
NWA decided to risk societal opprobrium and expand their demand for complete
inclusion in the state. They were determined not only to seek revision of the Police Law
but to raise the issue of women's suffrage. The December 1920 and January 1921
issues of Josei d¯mei carried, along with the organization's earlier petitions for revision
of the Police Law and regulation of men's access to marriage, a new demand calling
for revision of the House of Representatives Election Law, which restricted the right to
vote to males 25 or older who paid a minimum direct tax of three yen per year and who
had been listed in the election directory for one full year.108

Few women understood what revision of the Election Law would mean (and Ichikawa
claimed that most progressive women were not yet attuned to suffrage at that time), but
those who read about the NWA's new position on suffrage in Josei d¯mei were
increasingly comfortable with the idea of participation in national politics. Equal suffrage
rights began to enter discourse as a significant component of women's rights.

During the 1920s, Ichikawa's ideas developed in directions different from Hiratsuka's.
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According to Ichikawa, Hiratsuka’s ideology was based on the "principle of mothers’
rights" (bokenshugi), a concept which contrasted significantly with her own "principle
of women’s rights" (jokenshugi). Ichikawa later wrote:

Although Hiratsuka emphasized raising the position of women, obtaining
their rights, and male-female equality, she attached a great deal of
importance to the household and hoped very much to protect mothers
and children.109
Hiratsuka believed in improving women’s status through protection of motherhood. For
Ichikawa, the relational role was secondary; she wished to improve the status of all
women, irrespective of their relationship to children. While motherhood protection in its
own right was important to Ichikawa, she felt, in the 1920s, that women’s political
empowerment was not to be achieved through using the power of the state to protect
mothers, but through recognition of male-female equality.
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In a 1920 article, Ichikawa articulated her beliefs in terms of the ‘principle of women's
rights’ ideology.

Aren't we [women] treated completely as feeble-minded children? Why
is it all right to know about science and literature and not all right to be
familiar with politics and current events? Why is it acceptable to read and
write but not to speak and listen? A man, no matter what his occupation
or educational background, has political rights, but a woman, no matter
how qualified, does not have the same rights. . . . If we do not understand
the politics of the country we live in, we will not be able to understand
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conditions in our present society.
For Ichikawa, cultivating oneself through education and thereby earning social respect
was insufficient, particularly in light of the fact that it failed to gain women the rights their
Meiji-era sisters had assumed would be incorporated in the developing Meiji system.

In December 1920, Ichikawa published an article entitled ‘Absolute Equality between
Men and Women?’ in Fujin k¯ron, in which she discussed the differences in the United
States between feminists demanding complete legal equality with men and those
advocating special and distinctive treatment for women, especially workplace
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protections.112 She suggested that a similar debate was emerging among Japanese
women. For Ichikawa, the central feminist debate was between special protections for
women and identical treatment of both sexes. Both sides of this debate took an
established state for granted.

Absolute equality between men and women? Which is right or wrong? I
have outlined the problem here and have decided to wait for the
comments of other intellectuals.113
One intellectual from whom Ichikawa may have wished to hear was socialist feminist
Yamakawa Kikue. In April 1921, Yamakawa and others organized Japan’s first socialist
women’s association, the Red Wave Society (Sekirankai). The Red Wave Society’s
manifesto, written by Yamakawa in 1921, condemned capitalism for turning women into
‘slaves at home and oppress[ing] us as wage slaves outside the home. It turns many
of our sisters into prostitutes.’114 She decried capitalism for engendering (in both senses
of the word) imperialism, which deprived women of their male loved ones, thereby
defining the problems of capitalism in terms of women's losses rather than men's.115 But
like socialist women elsewhere, Yamakawa would find her feminism marginalized by
socialist men and in contention with the positions of non-socialist feminists.

Yamakawa, as her bourgeois sisters, foregrounded protection of women as a function
of the state. But unlike the NWA, she did not take the existing Japanese state for
granted but rather envisioned a state that eschewed capitalism. Yamakawa Kikue's
article, ‘The New Woman's Association and the Red Wave Society,’ appeared in the
July 1921 issue of Taiy¯.116 Criticizing the NWA, she wrote:

there is absolutely no way in a capitalist society to alleviate the misery of
female workers. We believe it is a sin to waste the strength of women
workers in a . . time-consuming Diet movement--that is, in any movement
which digresses from the only road to salvation for women, the
destruction of capitalism. However, bourgeois gentlewomen, because
they cannot trust or imagine a society beyond capitalism, concentrate
their energies on alleviating the misery of women workers in a superficial
and ineffective way.117
The months after Yamakawa’s article saw a period of considerable activity by women
47

in Japan. Much of this activity was stimulated by the amendment of Article 5, Clause
Two of the Public Peace Police Law.
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Taking advantage of their newly-won right to

attend political rallies (they still could not join political parties), women began to
organize new groups through which they could make additional demands. Some
worked for women’s political rights, others pushed for an end to licensed prostitution
and other goals. Some groups of women, like those involved in housewives’ campaigns
to rationalize home life, might not have described themselves as women’s rights
activists, though their leaders often did embrace the demand for women’s political
rights. Their greater public involvement coincided with and was encouraged by other
women’s increased public visibility. In short, it was becoming unexceptional for women
of a variety of political persuasions to take part in some types of political discourse.
Women’s groups of all sorts blossomed in the early 1920s: consumer groups of varied
political persuasions, socialist feminist groups, bourgeois descendents of the NWA, the
venerable Women’s Reform Society and its suffragist arm, and so on. Feminist
reformism permeated Taish¯ liberal culture, but in mid-1923 it was not coordinated to
focus on political rights for women as a class. A jolt was needed to persuade activist
women of the importance of joint activity.

That jolt was provided by the great earthquake that hit the Kant¯ Plain on 1 September
1923. In the aftermath of the quake, the Women’s Reform Society’s Kubushiro Ochimi
and other women turned to relief work to supply thousands of Tokyo residents with
food, clothing, and shelter. Women from Christian churches and other groups in the
Tokyo area started distributing milk to children and developed a sense of solidarity
through shared compassion and concern. Some were housewives with little or no
experience in organized cooperative activities. Others were members of alumnae
groups and women's auxiliary organizations. There were socialists like Yamakawa
Kikue who disregarded ideological differences to participate in relief measures with
middle-class Christians and housewives.119 On 28 September 1923, approximately 100
leaders from forty-three different organizations agreed to formalize their spontaneous
cooperative efforts and joined forces in an organization named the Tokyo Federation
of Women's Organizations (Tokyo Reng¯ Fujinkai).120
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The earthquake’s destruction had created a situation that demanded effective
cooperation. After the Tokyo Federation finished emergency distribution of food and
clothing to the poor and finding shelter for the homeless, many members continued to
meet.121 Sometime in late 1923 or early 1924, the organization was divided into five
sections: society, employment, labour, education, and government.122 Within these
sections, women discussed a variety of issues, including motherhood protection,
licensed prostitution, the problems of working women, and political rights for women.
Not only did women have the opportunity to resume discussion of problems attracting
their attention before the earthquake, they also cooperated with women from
organizations with different basic objectives.

The Tokyo Federation’s government section focussed on issues of political rights,
discussing means of using the state to earn inclusion. It also examined the character
and direction of the Japanese women’s movement. That fall, government section
director Kubushiro Ochimi decided to call a meeting of women interested in working for
women's political rights. Sixty to seventy women attended a ‘women's suffrage
movement workshop’ on 13 and 14 November 1924 at the Reform Society's Women's
Home in the ®kubo section of Tokyo.
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This meeting spawned the League for the

Realization of Women's Suffrage (Fujin Sanseiken Kakutoku Kisei D¯mei) on 13
December 1924, the principal suffrage organization in the interwar years. As its name
indicated, the League for the Realization of Women's Suffrage would concentrate on
obtaining political rights for women. Political rights, declared the manifesto proclaiming
the founding of the organization, were essential to improving the status of Japanese
women:

1. It is our responsibility to destroy customs that have existed in this
country for the past twenty-six hundred years and to construct a new
Japan that promotes the natural rights of men and women;
2. As women have been attending public schools with men for half a
century since the beginning of the Meiji period and our opportunities
in higher education have continued to expand, it is unjust to exclude
women from universal suffrage;
3. Political rights are necessary for the protection of nearly four million
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working women in this country ;
4. Women who work in the household must be recognized before the
law to realize their full human potential;
5. Without political rights we cannot achieve public recognition at either
the national or local level of government;
6. It is both necessary and possible to bring together women of different
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religions and occupations in a movement for women’s suffrage.

This list is a remarkably clear and succinct statement of the meaning of rights among
middle-class feminists in the Taish¯ era. Article I unequivocally contrasted ‘natural
rights of men and women’ with venerable ‘customs’ that must be destroyed. Japanese
society, that is, buried the rights of individual men and women under unnatural customs.
In contrast to the Meiji-era optimism about the ability of education to elevate the status
of women, Article II of the 1924 manifesto rued the continuing denial of even educated
women’s rights, though it implied--as did Meiji-era feminism--that there should be a
connection between education and rights. Article III tied together rights and protection
for women, an important Taish¯-era concern. Article IV called for recognition of all
women’s full humanity, and Article V connected rights and recognition in the public
sphere, both issues raised in the Meiji era.

Article VI, which focussed on

implementation rather than on fundamental principles, recognized the need for a
movement. Thus, this manifesto reiterated some of the Meiji-era discourse of rights in
terms of respectability, but also explicitly called on the state to include women. Article
I suggested, moreover, that including women as men were included might be
insufficient, since both men and women had natural rights that had been inadequately
promoted.

To achieve the goals of the manifesto, the proclamation announced three resolutions.
First, the organization resolved to demand that the Fiftieth Diet session grant women
civic rights on the municipal (city, town, village) level. The City Code and the Town and
Village Code, promulgated in 1888 by Meiji leaders who ‘saw the importance of
cultivating in the people the modern ideas of public participation in processes of self-
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government,’ gave local governments ‘the [autonomous] right to enact laws and
ordinances effective within their own administrative boundaries.’
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But the laws also

defined very specifically the qualifications for achieving status as a k¯min (citizen) on
the local level. Only men over twenty-five residing in their district for two years and
either owning land or paying a minimum annual tax of two yen were eligible to vote in
local elections and to serve on local governing bodies.126 Kubushiro, in presenting the
manifesto to the women assembled to mark the founding of the League for the
Realization of Women's Suffrage, charged that the law, by preventing women from
participating in government as responsible citizens, violated the civil rights of Japanese
women. ‘In order to obtain our local rights in cities, towns, and villages, the word `male'
must be eliminated from the pertinent articles of this law.’127
Second, the manifesto resolved that:

We demand that revisions in the House of Representatives Election Law
to be presented before the upcoming Fiftieth Diet include the equality of
women and men, so that we, as half the population of the nation, may
fully carry out our responsibilities.
Here, Kubushiro analogized rights of participation in civil society with responsibilities.
Even if women and men had different responsibilities, both were equally entitled to
citizenship.

And third, the manifesto resolved that Article 5 of the Public Peace Police Law be
completely revised, and the three characters "go: joshi" (five: women) be removed from
clause two in order to permit women freedom of political association.

Based on these goals, the new group petitioned the Diet for civil rights. The suffragists'
expectations were high right before the scheduled debate on amending political rights
laws in the Fiftieth Diet session. Three weeks earlier, in late February 1925, the
Kenseikai-dominated House of Representatives had passed the promised universal
manhood suffrage bill. Under the provisions of this law, only male subjects over twentyfive were eligible to elect members of the House of Representatives, and only those
over thirty were permitted to become candidates for elective office. Although many
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liberals welcomed the expansion of the electorate, Ichikawa and her colleagues
criticized the new legislation because ‘giving the vote only to men and excluding women
is not universal suffrage.’128 Despite the Diet's recent limitation of suffrage rights by
gender and its passage of a Peace Preservation Law designed to curb leftist political
expression, feminists had not thrown in the towel.129 They looked forward to Diet
discussions of women's suffrage and welcomed the opportunity to resume lobbying in
the Diet. The women succeeded in convincing a small group of representatives, most
of them in their thirties, to introduce several items for discussion:

1. An amendment to the Public Peace Police Law of 1900 giving women
the right to join political parties and associations;
2. A petition to encourage women's higher education;
3. A petition for women's suffrage in national elections;
4. A petition to make changes in the City Code (1888) and the Town and
Village Code (1888), allowing women to vote and become candidates
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for office on the local level.
When these four items came up for discussion on 10 March, a date designated by
suffragists as ‘women's Diet day’ (gikai fujin dee) because four of the 25 items
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scheduled for discussion concerned women's rights,

some 200 women filled the

visitors' section in the balcony overlooking the Diet chambers. Their optimism
contrasted with the mocking tone of press reportage that day. Describing those they
called ‘veterans of women’s suffrage,’ the Tokyo Asahi Shinbun reported on 10 March
1925 that ‘They talk big in their shrill voices.’
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The following day, the Asahi printed a

caricature of four Diet members with ribbons in their hair signifying sympathy toward
women. Diet speeches in opposition to the proposed petitions and amendment were
also full of vitriol, but in the end, the proposals were all approved by the Lower House.
Three of the items voted on were only petitions and thus did not become law, and the
Police Law amendment was killed in the Upper House, but it is noteworthy that these
proposals for expanding women's rights fared as well as they did.133 The partial success
of 10 March gave suffragist women hope that they might achieve civil rights. Suffragists
shortened the name of their group to Women's Suffrage League (Fusen Kakutoku
D¯mei) and made a public appeal for fusen. This appeal was symbolically important.
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The women were fortunate in that fusen, when written with different characters, meant
either ‘universal suffrage’ or ‘women's suffrage’. Fusen had been on the lips of activists
for years but had been virtually synonomous with ‘male suffrage’; the WSL made a
tactical decision to buy into the acceptable discourse on male rights by taking
advantage of the homonym.134 They emphatically stated that fusen, or universal
suffrage, was incomplete without fusen, or women's suffrage.

As with the decision to change their group's name, suffragists issued the following
declaration defining the scope of their future activities:

The foundation for the construction of a new Japan has been laid and, as
expected, the [male] suffrage bill was passed by the Fiftieth Diet session.
However, along with men who are under 25 or who "receive public or
private assistance," we women who comprise half this country's
population have been left without political rights. . . . Therefore, women
should put aside their emotional, religious, and ideological differences
and cooperate as women. . . . We should concentrate our efforts on
achieving the singular goal of political rights. We should work closely with
the political parties but maintain a position of absolute neutrality [in
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partisan matters].
Women’s rights discourses and activism did not die with the Taish¯ era but rather
expanded and grew in diverse directions. Suffragism continued to be a central feature,
fueling the rhetoric and actions of groups dedicated to suffrage as a sine qua non of
rights as well as being supported by groups with other primary agendas.136 These latter
groups took for granted the desirability of rights, despite their differences concerning the
meanings of rights other than the vote, which virtually all supported to some degree.
Rights within the existing state system might be just a stop-gap till a revolutionary state
could be created--as socialist women advocated in their feminist demands in the leftist
labour movement in the late Taish¯ era,137 or they might be framed in terms of inclusion
in the existing civil society.138 In both cases, they were articulated within existing
regimes of power. Feminists increasingly expressed rights as protections in the 1930s,
when concepts of rights based on the ‘individual’ were potentially subversive. Inclusion
in the state and/or civil society, many feminists believed, could be achieved in multiple
ways, including consumer movements, ‘election purification’ movements, protection of
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labourers, welfare assistance to single mothers and their children, and other publicsphere activities producing gendered social-welfare reforms. Rights remained a central
feature of these various activities. The permutations of rights discourses against shifting
social and political backgrounds, especially as the state became increasingly reified in
the early twentieth century, both accompanied and drove changes in the relationship
of women to the state.
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Barbara Molony, ’The State and Women in Modern Japan: Feminist
Discourses in the Meiji and Taish¯ Eras’
COMMENT
by
Ann Waswo
There are two facets of this paper on which I’d like to comment, but first I’d like to make
some observations about the emergence of women as a topic of inquiry in modern
Japanese studies. Today we are helping to commemorate the 20th anniversary of the
Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, and
back when the Centres were established in the late 1970s [and before Dr Hunter got to
work] I think it is fair to say not only that Japanese women hardly featured at all in the
existing scholarly literature, but also that hardly anyone thought their absence at all
strange. I certainly didn’t, even though I was mildly interested in the then relatively new
field of women’s studies and in at least some of the issues then being debated by
American feminists.

This was brought home to me recently when, for another purpose altogether, I made a
crude content analysis of the first [1978] and second [1996] editions of Kenneth Pyle’s
generally excellent textbook, The Making of Modern Japan. In the process I discovered
two references to Japanese women in the first edition [out of a very meagre number of
references, I might add] that hadn’t bothered me at all when I had encountered them
back in the 1970s, but which I now reacted to with some distaste. The first was the
statement that the ‘women, primarily young peasant girls’ who made up almost 60
percent of the industrial workforce in the Taish¯ era ‘were hardly the stuff of which
radical labor movements are made’ [p. 125]. The second was a long anecdote taken
from Douglas MacArthur's Reminiscences, which concerned the presence of an alleged
prostitute among the 38 women elected to the Diet in 1946 and the General's opinion
that, as the woman in question had received over 250,000 votes, she must have got
support from many more people than her customers alone [p. 162]. Both of these
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references have been deleted from the second edition of the book, and a large
proportion of the one hundred or so newly written pages of text interspersed here and
there among the original pages concern women – in the home, in the community, in the
workplace, from bakumatsu to the present day. While there had been no mention of
‘women’ in the index of the first edition, now there is an extensive entry. In the sense
that a textbook on any subject reflects a prevailing episteme and synthesizes the
research findings of other scholars, it would appear that Japanese women have finally
won their place in history.

But to what effect? Political correctness and/or beguiling glimpses into the minutiae of
daily life aside, what real insights do we gain from their presence in the narrative of
history? Here I return to Professor Molony's paper and to my comments proper.

The first of these relates to the methodology with which the paper is infused. So long as
historians and scholars in other disciplines remained content within the ‘prison house of
language’ they inhabited, they were constrained to schematize reality into syntactically
manageable compartments - either into such binary opposites as ‘for’ or ‘against’, or
‘the elite’ and ‘the masses’, or into that mystical trinity of characterizations that
somehow gave western readers the sense they were getting an appropriately nuanced
explication.

The invention of the notion of ‘discourse’ about and around all facets of an issue has
opened new frontiers of conceptualization and understanding on this front, and we see
an example of it here, in Professor Molony's focus on ‘discourses on women's rights’
from mid-Meiji to the mid-1920s. From the very outset she takes us beyond simple
dichotomies and mystically compelling trinities into the complex and shifting ground of
argument and activity over decades. In so doing she creates space for men as well as
women, for small victories as well as defeats and - most importantly - for contextual
change in how the key issues were perceived by diverse participants over time. In case
you didn't notice, that was a trinity of characterizations, and I expect most of you
resonated mystically with its cadence. At any rate, I think this discourse-based approach
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takes us a lot further into understanding the historical experiences of Japanese women
than, say, the now rather familiar narrative descriptions of the hardships of life for young
girls from Hida or the passionate arguments about motherhood protection among the
most famous Japanese Bluestockings that crop up all the time in ‘traditional’ histories of
women in the Meiji and Taish¯ eras. Instead of surrogates for a complex historical
reality, we are getting closer to the reality itself. Professor Molony is also to be thanked
for getting us there with only a modicum of the theory and jargon that often makes the
going rough for ordinary mortals such as myself.

Turning now to the second issue, I think Professor Molony's paper contributes in a
useful, albeit indirect, way to the on-going academic rehabilitation of the imperial
Japanese state. Much demonized by postwar scholars of diverse nationalities and
diverse ideological persuasions, that state is beginning to emerge as a rather less
omnipotent and occasionally less oppressive entity than generally portrayed in the past
fifty years. While it would be mindless to go to the other extreme and treat it [or any
state] as totally benign, just getting beyond the monolithic ‘it’ and starting to delve into
the entire range of state behavior and the gamut of actors performing state functions
over time makes great sense.

In Professor Molony's paper, we encounter not only ‘heroic’ resistance to the state, but
also demands for inclusion in it and for the securing of state aid in eliminating
oppression from other sources such as the workplace and, perhaps most crucially, the
patriarchal family. The patriotism of some of the women she mentions, who associated
women's rights with the strengthening of Japan vis-B-vis the West, is striking. We could,
of course, dismiss this as a rhetorical flourish or as false consciousness, but I think that
would be unwarranted. However masculinist the Japanese state may have been and
however futile the efforts of some women to gain full rights of participation within it,
there were clearly areas in which interests coincided and in which useful alliances
between women and the state were forged. Improvements in sanitation and healthcare
come immediately to mind. To an extent, no doubt a much greater extent than the
demonic image would allow, the imperial Japanese state responded to popular
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concerns, including the concerns of women. We still have a lot to learn about this
dynamic, and more studies such as this one will contribute to the learning process.
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